Taxation and Valuation
Leonid A. Levin

Summary

The greatest harm highway robbers inflict lies not in taken wallets but in impeded travel. Similarly, tax-reducing strategies put much sand in the wheels of the economy. Demands to replace our monumental tax code with a simple, graceful one that does not distort economic incentives heat up periodically in political debate, but such dreams never materialize.

A fundamental obstacle, not yet well understood in the economic literature, is the impossibility of objectively evaluating the tax base – assets, income, etc. One can see this even in toy examples, say, trying to assess the value of a position in Chess: great masters’ assessments will all differ. (Here computer theory adds an insight not provided by classical economics tools.)

A way around is to avoid evaluations by expressing the tax in natural units, not in cash. For publicly traded corporations these could be corporate shares. I discuss a simple (postcard-sized in all details) corporate tax system that avoids any distortion of incentives. (Tax tools meant to influence corporate policies should be set as explicit separate taxes or credits, open to public scrutiny, not hidden between lines of an incomprehensible tax code.) Roughly, the system is to take periodically a $t\cdot i$ fraction of shares to auction, where $t$ is the tax rate, $i$ is the interest rate (replacing all income taxes on publicly traded corporations, their subsidiaries, and shareholders).

(One way to view this is that tax on income invested in public sector is deferred, treated as interest-bearing debt. This removes the need to determine which part of the corporate value is untaxed income: All of it is if either investments into public sector are pretax, divestments taxed, or as in our equivalent but simpler case, vice versa.) The interest rate is defined via specially-designed bonds, so that the whole system can be shown precisely equivalent to a flat tax on investment return. Note that taxing the return directly is impossible: it would invite manipulation of stock market prices.

The main feature is that nothing corporations and investors do can change their tax ($t\cdot i$ fraction of shares), so they would do business exactly the same way they would without taxes.

Cash Taxes Cannot Avoid Distortion of Incentives.

Taxes have major costs beyond the revenues they collect: deadweight loss from distorted incentives, costs of compliance, enforcement costs, etc. (The report of the 2005 President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform mentions a trillion dollar annual waste.) Countless attempts to alleviate these effects invariably just shifted the distortions from one place to another.

Here is the key observation: Modern economics, based on classical game theory, assumes rational optimization of some consistent, legally definable values such as assets or their growth (i.e. income). This, however, fails to recognize the impossible hardness of consistent valuations and other types of optimal rational behavior in many games (much more so in real life). Economists do now recognize, besides grain, land, and coal, the relevance of another commodity: information. I doubt all fully realize how subtle this concept is, but even a cursory attention to it has brought progress. Yet, one more factor – intelligence – needs acknowledging. Even with full and perfect information the IRS couldn’t match all taxpayers in intelligence, and thus in ability to evaluate their assets. Lacking such ability, it acts like a bull in a china shop, vandalizing our economic life.
A Corporate Tax Code on a Postcard

First, the market-clearing interest rate $i$ is set via TIPS bonds designed so that either side – the Treasury and a Publicly Traded Corporation (PTC) – could unilaterally get any desired bond exposure at that rate. The Treasury must absorb all differences between supply and demand by buying such bonds back at the (inflation-adjusted) purchase price or issuing more. But it can change $i$ at-will (with due notice, so customers can buy or sell bonds before the new rate takes effect). So it controls the supply and demand to keep its desired bond exposure, too. The PTC tax rate $t$ is just set by the law. It should agree with the effective private sector rate, to keep the net capital flow between the PTC’s and the private sectors tax-revenue-neutral. Now, the full PTC tax code:

At regular dates (also on in-dividend dates), PTCs give the IRS $t \cdot i$ fraction of external (held outside the PTC sector) shares. They buy back shares for this or issue more. External shares are registered in a separate pool: auctioned shares dilute only this pool, not PTC-owned shares.

Going public turns the cost basis of prior shares tax-deductible. But it triggers a conversion tax: giving the IRS (to auction) options to buy a fraction $t$ of shares at the strike price totaling all corporate income tax to date. (Similar “strike price credits” can be used later for other taxes e.g., foreign taxes under US treaties.) Reconverting to private, a company can establish its shares’ cost basis $b$ by giving the IRS put options for a fraction $t$ of its shares at strike price $b$.

Bond-like securities with no voting rights can be taxed similarly if they are tradable in fractions. But a simpler equivalent tax is to charge their proceeds the interest $t \cdot i$, compounded for all the time the security was held outside the PTC sector.

This code replaces corporate income tax on PTCs, their subsidiaries, and all taxes on their shareholders’ dividends and capital gains. It distorts no incentives: boosting post- and pre-tax values is exactly the same. Its enforcement and compliance costs are minimal. It requires no complicated regulations, except those unrelated to taxes, say, protecting minority shareholders. The impossibility of hiding or delaying liability lowers tax rates. A steady trickle of auctioned shares may even have some stabilizing effect on the stock market. This Equity Tax (ET) emulates the $t$-rate tax on (real) return: market pressures would keep the variable $i$ close to return rates.

The precise match with tax on return is clearer via ET’s equivalent but a bit more cumbersome variant: ET*. It differs from ET like IRAs from Roth IRAs: all investments (from private sector) are income-tax-deductible and divestments are income-taxed (both at rate $t$). Then the entire stock market capitalization $V$ would be untaxed income, the deferred tax $t \cdot V$ on it – an enormous loan from the Treasury. To finance it the Treasury can sell bonds and pay interest $i \cdot t \cdot V$ on them, compensated by ET* (proceeds from the $i \cdot t$ flow of auctioned shares). Similarly, any company can spend this loan (deferred tax) on bonds, the interests on which would compensate its ET*. The net expense would be $t \cdot r$, to update the bond portfolio as the company’s worth grows by its return $r$.

---

2. L. Levin, “The Equity Tax and Shelter,” Tax Notes, 93(9).

3. Some wishful thinking: The US Constitution requires fair compensation for private property taken for public use. This seems to imply spending taxes to fairly benefit the taxpayers, e.g., giving them a tax-weighted say in approving public spending levels. Then, they would do a better job than the Congress in setting tax rates optimal for growth.

4. which cannot be taxed in cash based on stock prices, lest firms manipulate the market, undermining its integrity.

5. Personal tax is progressive. But it can be viewed as having a flat rate $t$ applied after deducting typical living expenses which grow sublinearly with earnings.
Just One Issue in a Broader Scope.

The tools discussed work only for the PTC sector. The point was that the failure of all persistent tax reform efforts had a cause which, while fundamental, can be circumvented in important cases. The above tools cannot add grace to taxes on closely-held business or personal earnings. Yet those, too, have aspects that can benefit from reforms. Some widely discussed examples:

**Dividends and capital gains** taxes have low rates but apply largely to income already taxed at the corporate level. This is widely criticized. A full corporate rate tax (as this income is impersonal) on the **untaxed part only** may be more consistent. This can mean allowing (income-taxed) companies to deduct paid dividends and losses on share repurchase.

**Gifts/Estates** also should avoid double taxation. Stock market income and gifts received can be excluded, as they should have been fully taxed already. The rest, instead of a large standard deduction, can get a tax credit for all income taxes the donor ever paid.

**Taxes on medical expenses** penalize deductibles in medical insurance. Needlessly low deductibles make one careless with expenses, which is widely blamed for skyrocketing medical costs. Taxing medical expenses up to the same cut-off level regardless of whether paid by the taxpayers or by their insurance can rectify this harmful tax-induced distortion.

**Many other** concerns and ideas would, of course, resurface with the tax reform drive heating up again. E.g., taxing housing rent expense depresses population mobility. (As they say, “When a tenant marries the landlord, the national income shrinks.” :-)

The topic of the publicly traded sector is just one of a great many, however, it is a large one, assuring that at least some significant improvements are achievable.

---

6 The insurance effect is diffusion of responsibility. This agrees with the general liberal ideology which has a reason: Since society absorbs much of the rewards of one’s success, it should also absorb much of the pains of one’s failure. Otherwise people would have a suboptimal risk tolerance. The conservative counterargument seems to be: “While three lefts make a right, two wrongs do not.” :-). It seems general tax policies should be neutral on such issues.