CS 511, Fall 2018, Handout 04 Semantics of *Classical* Propositional Logic

(as opposed to Intuitionistic Propositional Logic)

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Some Terminology

- the semantics (or formal semantics) of a formal logic L is sometimes called the model theory of L.
- ► the model theory of classical propositional logic is defined in terms of Boolean algebras: a model (or interpretation) for the logic is a two-element Boolean algebra, *i.e.*, an assignment of truth-values to the propositional atoms with the standard boolean operations on them (∧, ∨, and ¬).
- the standard boolean operations can be defined using truth tables.
- the model theory of intuitionistic propositional logic can be defined in terms of Heyting algebras (also called pseudo-Boolean algebras): a model (or interpretation) is a Heyting algebra.
- every Heyting algebra satisfying the law of excluded middle $a \lor \neg a = \top$ or, equivalently, the double negation law $\neg \neg a = a$ is a Boolean algebra.

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Introductory Remarks

- for the semantics of <u>classical</u> propositional logic, it suffices to consider the familiar **two-element Boolean algebra**.
- the two-element Boolean algebra is only one member of the infinite family of Boolean algebras (for more on this topic, click here).
- the two-element Boolean algebra is not the only way of defining the semantics of propositional logic, *e.g.*, we can use what are called three-valued Kleene algebras to define the semantics of propositional logic (click here).
- Heyting algebras is not the only way of defining the semantics of intuitionistic propositional logic, *e.g.*, we can use what are called Kripke structures instead (click here and here).

Truth Tables

- Truth tables were already introduced in Handout 01.
- $\blacktriangleright\,$ Given a propositional wff $\varphi,$ a two-element Boolean model of φ
 - -*i.e.*, the formal semantics of φ is just a truth table!

Another More Complicated Truth-Table

not of a single wff, but of a sequent $(P \land \neg Q) \rightarrow R, \neg R, P \vdash Q$, which was shown **formally derivable** by the proof rules at the end of **Handout 03**.

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PQR
$$\neg Q$$
 $\neg R$ $P \land \neg Q$ $(P \land \neg Q) \rightarrow R$ TTTFFFTTTFFTFTTFTTFTTTFTTFTTTFFTTFFTTFFTFTFFTTFFTFFTFFTTFTFFTTFTFFFTTTFFFTTT

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when all the premises (shaded in gray) evaluate to T, so does the conclusion (shaded in green) – this occurs in row 2 of the truth table,

▶ in such a case we write $(P \land \neg Q) \rightarrow R, \neg R, P \models Q$.

If, for every interpretation/model/valuation (*i.e.*, assignment of truth values to the propositional atoms) for which all of the WFF's φ₁, φ₂,..., φ_n evaluate to T, it is also the case that ψ evaluates to T, then we write:

$$\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \ldots, \varphi_n \models \psi$$

and say that " $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_n$ semantically entails ψ " or also "every model of $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \dots, \varphi_n$ is a model of ψ ".

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Theorem (Soundness):

If $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \ldots, \varphi_n \vdash \psi$ then $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \ldots, \varphi_n \models \psi$.

Theorem (Completeness):

If $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \ldots, \varphi_n \models \psi$ then $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \ldots, \varphi_n \vdash \psi$.

simple version of **soundness**: if $\vdash \psi$ then $\models \psi$

Informally, "if you can prove it, then it is true".

Simple version of **completeness**: if $\models \psi$ then $\vdash \psi$

Informally, "if it is true, then you can prove it".

• if $\models \psi$, then we say ψ is a **tautology** or a **valid formula**.

• if $\vdash \varphi$, then we say φ is (formally) derivable or a (formal) theorem.

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