Boston University
Distinguished Lecture Series 2009
Approximate Privacy: Foundations and Quantification
Joan Feigenbaum
Yale University
Time: May 4, 3pm Place: KCB 106
(Kenmore Classroom Building)
Joan Feigenbaum is the Grace Murray Hopper Professor of Computer Science at Yale University. Her research interests include Internet algorithms, computational complexity, security and privacy, and digital copyright. Between finishing her Ph.D. at Stanford in 1986 and starting at Yale in 2000, she was with AT&T, participating very broadly in the company's Information-Sciences research agenda. At Yale, she has been a principal in several high-profile activities funded by NSF and ONR. She currently serves on the Scientific Council of the Web Sciences Research Institute, on the Executive-Committee of the ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computational Theory, as Vice Chair of the ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce (Sigecom), and as a Program-Committee Member of the 2009 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC'09) and the Internet Monetization Track of the 2009 World Wide Web conference (WWW'09). Professor Feigenbaum is a Fellow of the ACM.

Abstract: Due to proliferation of online sensitive data about individuals and organizations, concern about their privacy of has become a top priority. For several formal definitions privacy, unfortunately, many negative results exist about the feasibility of maintaining privacy of sensitive data in realistic networked environments. We use communication-complexity based definitions of privacy-aproximation ratio to investigate the extent to which approximate privacy is achievable in two standard problems: the 2nd-price Vickrey auction and the millionaires problem of Yao. We show for both problems, that even close approximations of perfect privacy are impossible or infeasibly costly to achieve. By contrast, if the values of the parties are drawn uniformly at random from 2k values, then, for both problems, simple and natural communication protocols have privacy-approximation ratios that are linear in k. We conjecture that the uniform distribution over inputs is actually the worst case from the point of view of the protocol designer and hence that this improved privacy-approximation ratio is achievable for any probability distribution. (Joint work with Aaron Jaggard and Michael Schapira.)