

(Cloud) Colocation Games



- ☐ IaaS cloud providers offer fixed-sized instances for a fixed price
- ☐ Provider's profit = number of instances sold; no incentive to colocate customers
- □ Virtualization enables colocation to reduce costs without QoS compromises
- □ Customers' selfishness reduces the colocation process to a strategic game

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Colocation Games: Questions



- □ Does it reach equilibrium?
- ☐ If so, how fast?
- ☐ If so, at what price (of anarchy)?
- ☐ How about multi-resource jobs/hosts?
- ☐ How about multi-job tasks?
- ☐ How about job/host dependencies?
- ☐ How could it be implemented?
- ☐ How would it perform in practice?
- □ ...

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Colocation Game: Model



- \square A hosting graph G = (V,E)
 - V & E labeled by capacity vector R and fixed price P
- \square Workloads as task graphs $T_i = (V_i, E_i)$
 - V_i & E_i labeled by a utilization vector W
- □ Valid mappings
 - $V_i \rightarrow V \& E_i \rightarrow E$: $\Sigma W \leq R$; supply meets demand
- ☐ Shapley Cost function
 - Cost P of a resource is split among workloads mapped to it in proportion to use

$$c_M(T_i) = \sum_{j \in \{V_i, E_i\}} P_j \frac{w_{ij}}{U_j}$$

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The General Colocation Game (GCG)




☐ GCG is a pure strategies game:


Each workload is able to make a (better response) "move" from a valid mapping M into another M so as to minimize its own cost


- ☐ Example applications:
 - Overlay reservation, e.g., on PlanetLab
 - CDN colocation, e.g., on CloudFront


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
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

















Can we think of a better mechanism? □ Customer cost should be a function of supply and demand ■ Supply may vary over time ■ Supplier's cost may vary over time ■ Demand may vary over time ■ Demand may exhibit structure, and may be subject to malleable constraints □ Need language to specify supply and demand (and act as basis for SLAs) □ Necember 9, 2011 In Cloud (Markets) We Trust by A. Bestavros @ DIMACS 15











Beyond Simple Types



- ☐ A workload is a set of requests (tasks), each with its SLA, subject to constraints:
 - Temporal dependencies between tasks
 - Start and end times
- ☐ Flexibilities might exist; another source of elasticity:
 - Min and max delays between tasks
 - Deadline slacks

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The Customer's Perspective



- ☐ Why should customers expose the elasticity of their workloads?
- ☐ Current IaaS (fixed) pricing mechanisms do not provide proper incentives
- Implications:
 - Less efficient workload management
 - Customers (should) game the marketplace

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Dynamic Pricing: Shapley Value



- ☐ Well defined concept for fair cost sharing from coalitional game theory
 - Marginal contribution to the total cost, averaged over every permutation, e.g., for 3 workloads

$$s(w_1) = \frac{1}{6} \left(\frac{2 c(w_1) + [c(w_2 w_1) - c(w_2)] + [c(w_3 w_1) - c(w_3)] + }{[c(w_2 w_3 w_1) - c(w_2 w_3)] + [c(w_3 w_2 w_1) - c(w_3 w_2)]} \right)$$

- Impractical to calculate
- Estimate by sampling random permutations

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