

## 6 General One-Way and Trapdoor Functions

In this section, we will try to generalize what we've seen so far. For example, we know how to build a secure encryption out of RSA, but what exactly is RSA itself? In modern terms, it is a trapdoor permutation family, which we define below.

### 6.1 One-Way Functions

Let us first introduce one-way functions. We've actually seen concrete examples of them before; this is just a generalization, so we can talk of a one-way function  $f$  independent of its particular implementation.

**Definition 1.** A function  $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$  is one-way if

1. it is polynomial-time computable;
2. it is hard to invert, i.e., for all probabilistic polynomial-time  $A$  there exists a negligible function  $\eta$  such that, for all  $k$ ,  $\Pr[f(A(f(x), 1^k)) = f(x)] \leq \eta(k)$ , where the probability is taken over a random choice of  $k$ -bit string  $x$  and coin tosses of  $A$ .

Note that it's important that we are not requiring  $A$  to find  $x$ ; rather, any inverse of  $f(x)$  is fine. Of course, if  $f$  is a permutation (i.e., a bijective function), then it would be equivalent to require  $A$  to find  $x$ , because  $x$  is the only inverse of  $f(x)$ .

Note also the importance of selecting the input to  $A$ : the input is not selected uniformly at random; rather,  $x$  is selected uniformly at random, and the input is  $f(x)$ . Of course, again, if  $f$  is a permutation, then the two are equivalent.

An example is the following  $f$ : split the  $k$ -bit input into strings  $a$  of length  $\lfloor k/2 \rfloor$  and  $b$  of length  $\lceil k/2 \rceil$ , and output  $c = ab$ . The inverter  $A$  would have to find two *large* factors of  $c$ , which is believed to be hard. Note that the input  $c$  of  $A$  is not a uniformly selected integer; in particular, we know that it has two factors of (nearly) the same length.

The existence of one-way functions is the minimal assumption necessary (though often not sufficient) for almost anything interesting in cryptography. Note that the assumption that one-way functions exist is stronger than the assumption that  $P \neq NP$  (intuitively, because one-way functions are hard on the average case, whereas it could be that NP-complete problems are hard only very infrequently).

A *one-way permutation* is a one-way function that is a bijection of  $\{0, 1\}^k$  to  $\{0, 1\}^k$  for each  $k$ .

### 6.2 One-Way Function Families

The examples we've seen in class, such as modular squaring, RSA, and Discrete Logarithm, are not quite one-way functions by the above definition. Rather, they are one-way function families, as defined below.

**Definition 2.** Let  $I$  be an index set. A collection of functions  $\{f_i : D_i \rightarrow R_i\}_{i \in I}$  is called one-way, if:

1. there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Gen that, on input  $1^k$ , picks  $i \in I$ ;
2. there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm  $M$  that, on input  $i \in I$ , picks  $x \in D_i$ ;
3. given  $i$  and  $x$ , the value  $f_i(x)$  is polynomial-time computable;
4. for all probabilistic polynomial-time  $A$  there exists a negligible function  $\eta$  such that, for all  $k$ , if  $i$  is chosen by Gen( $1^k$ ) and  $x$  is chosen by  $M(i)$ ,  $\Pr[f_i(A(f_i(x), i, 1^k)) = f_i(x)] \leq \eta(k)$ , where the probability is taken over coin tosses of Gen,  $M$  and  $A$ .

For example, for Discrete Logarithm, the index set  $I = \{(p, g) | p \text{ is prime, } g \text{ is a generator of } \mathbb{Z}_p^*\}$ , and for  $(p, g) \in I$ ,  $D_{(p,g)} = R_{(p,g)} = \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  and  $f_{(p,g)}(x) = g^x \bmod p$ .

A *collection of one-way permutations* is a collection of one-way functions with the additional property that  $f_i$  is a permutation. The discrete logarithm collection is actually a collection of one-way permutations.

### 6.3 Trapdoor Permutations

A collection of one-way permutations with the additional property that the (unique) inverse is easy to obtain with some special information is called a collection of trapdoor permutations.

**Definition 3.** A collection of one-way permutations  $\{f_i : D_i \rightarrow R_i\}_{i \in I}$  is called *trapdoor* if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm  $\text{Inv}$  and if  $\text{Gen}$ , in addition to outputting  $i \in I$ , outputs a value  $t$  with the following property: for all  $x \in D_i$ ,  $\text{Inv}(t, f_i(x)) = x$ .

For example, RSA is a collection of trapdoor permutations. The index set consists of pairs  $(n, e)$ ; the trapdoor information  $t$  is  $(n, d)$ ; and the domain and the range are  $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$ .

### 6.4 Generalizing Results

To obtain a pseudorandom generator, both the Blum-Micali and the Blum-Blum-Shub generators simply selected a one-way permutation from a family, and iterated it multiple times on a random initial seed, each time outputting a bit that's hard to predict. It is natural to ask whether for any one-way permutation (family) there is such a bit. The following theorem of Goldreich and Levin answers this question in the affirmative. We state it somewhat informally, and do not prove it here.

**Theorem 1 ([GL89]).** *Let  $f$  be a one-way function (the same also holds for families of one-way functions). Let  $r$  be a random  $k$ -bit value. Then, for a random  $k$ -bit  $x$ , the bit  $r \cdot x$  is hard to compute with probability greater than  $1/2$ , given  $f(x)$  and  $r$ . (Here  $r \cdot x = r_1x_1 \oplus r_2x_2 \oplus \dots \oplus r_kx_k$ , the inner-product modulo 2 of  $r$  and  $x$ .)*

Therefore, our constructions of pseudorandom generators extend to *any* one-way permutation  $f$  (and, similarly, one-way permutation family). We simply take our seed to be  $(x, r)$ , let  $x_0 = x$ ,  $x_i = f(x_{i-1})$ , and output the bits  $b_i = x_i \cdot r$ .

Hence, we get

**Theorem 2.** *If one-way permutations (or families) exist, then so do pseudorandom generators.*

However, one-way functions are a weaker assumption, and it would be nice to know if pseudorandom generators can be based on just one-way functions, not permutations. The following theorem of Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin and Luby shows that one-way functions suffice. It is quite difficult to prove.

**Theorem 3 ([HILL99]).** *Pseudorandom generators exist if and only if one-way functions exist.*

Thus, one-way functions suffice for symmetric encryption. However, they do not suffice for public-key encryption: you really need the trapdoor to be able to go back. Note also that by generalizing our previous two bit-by-bit constructions, we know that trapdoor permutations suffice.

Finally, I want to mention two constructions of Levin's [Lev87, Lev03] that address the existence of one-way functions. In both, he constructs a single function  $U$  with the following property:  $U$  is one-way if one-way functions exist.  $U$  is known as the *universal one-way function*. The question of whether one-way functions exist reduces to the question of whether this specific single function is one-way.

## References

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