Randomness and Non-determinism^{*}

Leonid A. Levin[†] Boston University[‡]

Exponentiation makes the difference between the bit-size of this line and the number ($\ll 2^{300}$) of particles in the known Universe. The expulsion of exponential time algorithms from Computer Theory in the 60's broke its umbilical cord from Mathematical Logic. It created a deep gap between deterministic computation and – formerly its unremarkable tools – randomness and non-determinism. Little did we learn in the past decades about the power of either of these two basic "freedoms" of computation, but some vague pattern is emerging in relationships between them. The pattern of similar techniques instrumental for quite different results in this area seems even more interesting. Ideas like multilinear and low-degree multivariate polynomials, Fourier transformation over low-periodic groups seem very illuminating. The talk surveyed some recent results. One of them, given in a stronger form than previously published, is described below.

|x| will denote the length of string x. Let P be the set of fast, i.e. computable in time $T_{f(x)} = |x|^{O(1)}$, algorithms f(x) on binary strings. [Blum Micali 82, Yao 82] proposed a fast deterministic way to generate "nearly perfect" randomness, using the idea of a hard core or hidden bit. They assume certain length preserving functions $f \in P$ to be one-way (OWF), i.e. infeasible to invert (a non-deterministically easy task). Suppose it is hard to compute from f(x) not only x but even its one bit $b(x) \in \{\pm 1\}$, $b \in P$. Moreover, assume that even guessing b(x) with any noticeable correlation is infeasible. If f is bijective, f(x) and b(x)are both random and appear to be independent to any feasible test, thus increasing the initial amount |x|of randomness by one bit. Then, a short random seed x can be transformed into an arbitrary long string $\alpha(1), \alpha(2), \ldots$: $\alpha(i) = b(f^{(i)}(x))$. Such α passes any feasible randomness test. [Goldreich Levin 89] showed that every OWF f has such a hidden bit with security of f and b polynomially related. It also gives more details on the definitions below. Here this result is strengthened to yield the same security for f and b.

Let \overline{P} be the set of probabilistic algorithms $A(x,\omega)$ using coin-flips $\omega \in \{0,1\}^{\mathbb{N}}$ and running in average over ω time $\mathbb{E}_{\omega}T_{A(x,\omega)} = |x|^{O(1)}$. An inverter $I \in \overline{P}$ for f attempts to compute from f(x) a list of strings containing x. Its success rate $s_{I,f}(n)$ is the probability of $\{x \in \{0,1\}^n, \omega : x \in I(f(x),\omega)\}$. A guesser for $b: S \to \{\pm 1\}$ on $f \in \mathbb{P}$ is a \overline{P} -algorithm $G(y,\omega) \in \{0,\pm 1\}$. Its success rate is $s_{G,b,f}(n) = (\mathbb{E}_{x,\omega}G(f(x),\omega)b(x))^2/\mathbb{E}_{x,\omega}G(x,\omega)^2$, i.e. the inverse sample size needed to notice the correlation with b. The security of OWF f or of its hidden bit b is a lower bound of 1/s(n) for all I (or G) and big enough n.

Let us pad a OWF f to f'(x,r) = (y,r), y = f(x); $x, y, r \in \mathbb{Z}_2^n$. Let $b(x,r) = (-1)^{(x \cdot r)}$; $v_i = 0^{i-1}10^{n-i}$. We fix y, ω , denote $G_r = G(y, r, \omega)$ and $c(x) = \mathbb{E}_r b(x, r) G_r / \sqrt{\mathbb{E}_r G_r^2}$. We will build an inverter for f(x) with the success probability $\geq c(x)^2$. Due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, its overall success rate $\geq s_{G,b,f}$.

Note that c(x) (if extended to real vectors) is a generic, up to a constant factor, multilinear function with coefficients given by G_r . It is the Walsh (Fourier over group \mathbb{Z}_2^n) transformation of G_r .

Say c(x) > 0. Then averaging $(-1)^{(x\cdot r)}G_r$ over $> 2n/c(x)^2$ random pairwise independent r yields > 0 with probability > 1 - 1/2n, and the same for $(-1)^{(x\cdot r)}G_{r+v_i} = (-1)^{(x\cdot r)}G_{r+v_i}(-1)^{x_i}$. Let $k > \log(2n/c(x)^2)$. Take a random matrix $R \in \{0,1\}^{n \times k}$. Then the vectors Rp, $p \in \{0,1\}^k \setminus \{0^k\}$ are pairwise independent. So, for a fraction $\ge 1 - 1/2n$ of R, $\operatorname{sign} \sum_p (-1)^{xRp} G_{Rp+v_i} = (-1)^{x_i}$. We could thus find x_i for all i with probability 1/2 if we knew z = xR. But z is short: we can try all 2^k possible values!

So, the inverter flips $l(\omega) \leq 2n$ coins until the first 0 and sets $k = l + \lceil \log 5n \rceil$. With $2c(x)^2$ chance k is large enough. Then for a random R and all i, p it computes $g_i(p) = G_{Rp+v_i}$. It uses Fast Fourier on g_i to compute $h_i(z) = \sum_p (-1)^{(z \cdot p)} g_i(p)$. The sign of $h_i(z)$ is the *i*-th bit for the z-th member of output list.

^{*}in "European Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, 1992". J. Symb. Logic, 58(3):1102-1103, 1993.

[†]Supported by NSF grant CCR-9015276.

[‡]Computer Science department, Boston, MA 02215; (e-mail: Lnd bu.edu)

Using an $n \times i$ Toeplitz matrix in place of the vector r one can extract i bits from x rather than one. According to [GL], this will decrease the security of the bits by a factor of 2^i .

The power of the above theorem (and a weaker one in [GL]) can be seen even in the trivial case f(x) = 0. It is an OWF if x has any distribution such that the probability of x is always, say, $< 4^{-i}$. No relation between |x| and i or other condition is needed. Such "junk" x are much more available than random uniformly distributed strings. Having a fixed random r and an unlimited supply of such x, one can keep extracting i "nearly perfect," with security 2^i , random bits from each x. In this case the security (of f and thus of b) is probabilistic: it holds for functions i.e. algorithms with any oracle. This method requires no additional proof and puts much weaker assumptions on the distribution than the original Vazirani result.

The hidden bit works for any OWF. But only "almost bijections" are known to yield pseudorandom generators without crucial security loss. Suppose, however, we have a length preserving $f \in P$ with a polynomial fraction of y for which $x \in f^{-1}(y)$ is hard to find. We may try to convert it into an "almost bijection" with the same property. It may be that f'(a, x) = (a, f(x) + ax) (where a is in a finite field and slightly longer than x) will always do.

Acknowledgements

The idea of using pairwise independent strings and vectors v_i is due to [Alexi Chor Goldreich Schnorr 84]. Its use to modify [GL] proof was suggested to me by Charles Rackoff and R. Venkatesan. Avi Wigderson agreed to explain to me the Fast Fourier Transformation over non-cyclic groups, like the Walsh transformation over Z_2^n . I am indebted to them for this crucial information.

References

- [ACGS] W.Alexi, B.Chor, O.Goldreich and C.P.Schnorr. RSA and Rabin Functions: Certain Parts Are As Hard As the Whole. SIAM J. Comput., 17:194-209, 1988; also FOCS, 1984.
- [BFLS] L.Babai, L.Fortnow, L.Levin, M.Szegedy. Checking computations in polylogarithmic time. ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, pp. 21-31, 1991.
- [BM] M. Blum, S. Micali. How to Generate Cryptographically Strong Sequences of Pseudo-Random Bits. SIAM J. Comput., 13:850-864, 1984; also FOCS, 1982.
- [GL] O.Goldreich, L.Levin. A Hard-Core Predicate for all One-Way Functions. ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, pp. 25-32, 1989.
- [V] U.Vazirani. Efficiency Considerations in Using Semi-random Sources. ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, pp. 160-168, 1987.
- [Y] A.C. Yao. Theory and Applications of Trapdoor Functions. Proc. of IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Sci., pp. 80-91, 1982.

[add] additional references (in ICM-94, not here):
O. Goldreich, S. Goldwasser, S. Micali. How to Construct Random Functions. FOCS-84. J. ACM, 33/4:792-807, 1986.
L. Levin. One-Way Functions and Pseudorandom Generators. Combinatorica, 7(4):357-363, 1987. (earlier in STOC-1985).
Johan Hastad, Russell Impagliazzo, Leonid A. Levin, Michael Luby. Construction of a Pseudo-Random Generator from any One-Way Function. Internat.Comp.Sci.Inst. (Berkeley). Tech.Rep. 91-068, pp.1-36. 12/1991. To appear in SICOMP. Earlier versions in STOC-1989 [ILL] and STOC-1990 [H].