

A Hard-Core Predicate for all One-Way Functions*

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Abstract

A central tool in constructing pseudorandom generators, secure encryption functions, and in other areas are “hard-core” predicates b of functions (permutations) f , discovered in [Blum Micali 82]. Such $b(x)$ cannot be efficiently guessed (substantially better than 50-50) given only $f(x)$. Both b, f are computable in polynomial time.

[Yao 82] transforms any one-way function f into a more complicated one, f^* , which has a hard-core predicate. The construction applies the original f to many small pieces of the input to f^* just to get one “hard-core” bit. The security of this bit may be smaller than any constant positive power of the security of f . In fact, for inputs (to f^*) of practical size, the pieces effected by f are so small that f can be inverted (and the “hard-core” bit computed) by exhaustive search.

In this paper we show that every one-

way function, padded to the form $f(p, x) = (p, g(x))$, $\|p\| = \|x\|$, has by itself a hard-core predicate of the same (within a polynomial) security. Namely, we prove a conjecture of [Levin 87, sec. 5.6.2] that the scalar product of boolean vectors p, x is a hard-core of every one-way function $f(p, x) = (p, g(x))$. The result extends to multiple (up to the logarithm of security) such bits and to any distribution on the x 's for which f is hard to invert.

1 Introduction

One-way functions are fundamental to many aspects of Theory of Computation. Loosely speaking, one-way are those functions which are easy to evaluate but hard to invert. However, many applications such as pseudorandom generators [Blum Micali 82, Yao 82] and secure probabilistic encryption [Goldwasser Micali 82] require that the function has a “hard-core” predicate b . This $b(x)$ should be easy to evaluate on input x , but hard to guess (with a noticeable correlation) when given only the value of $f(x)$. Intuitively, the hard-core predicate “concentrates” the one-wayness of the function in a strong sense.

Clearly, permutations with hard-core pred-

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icates must be one-way. A natural question of practical and theoretical importance is *which* one-way functions have one. So far only partial answers have been given:

1. [Blum Micali 82] showed that the discrete exponentiation function, if it is one-way, has a hard-core predicate.¹ Analogous results for the RSA and Rabin functions (i.e. raising to a power modulo a composite integer) have been shown in [Alexi Chor Goldreich Schnorr 84].
2. [Yao 82] showed how any one-way permutation f can be used to construct another one-way permutation f^* which has a hard-core predicate. The function f^* partitions its input into many shorter inputs and applies f to each of them in parallel: $f^*(x_1 \dots x_{k^3}) = f(x_1) \dots f(x_{k^3})$, $\|x_i\| = k$. (For a proof and more refined analysis see [Levin 87].)

The drawback of the first set of results is their dependence on a specific intractability assumption (e.g. the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem). The second result offers a function f^* with security smaller than any constant power of the security of f .

This paper resolves the above question by providing a hard-core predicate for every one-way function. More specifically, for any s (e.g. $s(n) = n$, or $s(n) = 2^{\sqrt{n}}$), the following tasks are equivalent for probabilistic algorithms running in time $s(\|x\|)^{O(1)}$:

1. Given $f(x)$ find x for at least a fraction $s(\|x\|)^{-O(1)}$ of the x 's.
2. Given $f(x)$ and p , $\|p\| = \|x\|$, guess the Boolean inner-product $B(x, p)$ of x and p with a correlation (i.e. the difference

between the success and failure probabilities) of $s(\|x\|)^{-O(1)}$.

For any polynomial time computable f, b , there is always the smallest (within a polynomial) such s called the *security* of f and b , respectively. The security is a constructible function, and can be computed by trying all small guessing algorithms. It is assumed to grow very fast (at least $n^{1/o(1)}$).

2 Conventions

Let S be the set of finite and Ω of infinite strings in the alphabet $\{0, 1\}$; let $\|x\|$ be the length of x , $S_n \subset S$ be the set of strings of length n , and $x \circ y$ be the concatenation of x and y . We identify S (in lexicographical order) with $\mathbf{N} = \{0, 1, \dots\}$.

For simplicity, we consider only length preserving functions $f : S \rightarrow S$, $\|f(x)\| = \|x\|$. Let F be the set of such functions. The set of functions computable in polynomial time is denoted P . We almost always refer to predicates as having range $\{\pm 1\}$ instead of $\{0, 1\}$. The Boolean value σ corresponds to $(-1)^\sigma \in \{\pm 1\}$, and the exclusive-or of Boolean values corresponds to multiplication.

When the probability distribution of x is clear from the context, $E_x f(x)$ denotes the expected value of f . Thus, a Boolean predicate P holds with probability $E_x P(x)$.

Time bounds of the (adversarial) algorithms is assumed here to be huge comparative to input lengths. Thus we allow this preliminary draft to ignore factors of $\|x\|^{O(1)}$ in the running time. So time bound of $T(x)$ means that the algorithm may make $\|x\|^{O(1)} T(x)$ steps. These factors are easy to figure out from the context. This convention makes the choice of model of computation not so important.

¹Extended to all Abelian groups in [Kaliski 88].

3 The Results

Below, the function d merely generates a probability distribution of instances (and the condition $d \in F$ is not really essential). A simple case of interest is $d(x) = x$.

Let $I(\omega, y)$ be a probabilistic algorithm which attempts to invert $f \in F$, i.e. to compute a list containing x from $y = f(x)$, using $\omega \in \Omega$ as the source of internal coin flips. Its performance has two aspects: the running time $T_I(\omega, y)$ and the probability of success:

$$R_{I,f,d}(n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} E_{r,\omega}(x \in I(\omega, f(x))),$$

where $r \in S_n$, $x = d(r)$. We can combine these two measures (i.e. absorb the running time into $R_{I,f,d}$) in the following way. Without loss of generality, we require the mean running time $E_\omega T_I(\omega, y)$ of all *inverting algorithms* to be $O(1)$. Any algorithm can be modified to satisfy this requirement. For this purpose, I may use its power of flipping coins to set itself random time limits 2^t with probability, say, $2^{-t}/t^2$. This will decrease the probability of success in proportion to I 's original running time. Then $R_{I,f,d}$ accounts for running time as well as the probability of success and is called the *inverting rate* of I for f on d . It reflects the reciprocal of the time needed to notice by sampling the instances where I inverts f .

One-way functions are those invertible with a negligible rate only. Namely,

Definition 1 (One-way Functions): A function $f \in F$ is *one-way* on $d \in F$ with security $s: \mathbf{N} \rightarrow \mathbf{N}$ if $R_{I,f,d}(n) = o(1)/s(n)^\epsilon$, for some $\epsilon > 0$ and all probabilistic inverting algorithms I . The security is *strict* if $\epsilon > 1$.

Let $G(\omega, y) \in \{\pm 1, 0\}$ be a probabilistic algorithm which, given $y = f(x)$, attempts

to guess a predicate $b(x) \in \{\pm 1\}$, $b \in P$, using ω as the source of internal coin flips (0 means a refusal to guess). As with inverting algorithms above, without loss of generality, we restrict its average running time: $E_\omega T_G(\omega, y) = O(1)$. We define the *guessing rate* R of G for b from f to reflect the reciprocal of the time needed to notice by sampling the correlation between b and G , i.e. the number of trials needed to evaluate the expectation of their product. Due to the $O(1)$ restriction on expected running time, this number accounts for both the running-time and the correlation of G with b . The number of trials is determined by the reciprocal of

$$R_{G,f,b,d}(n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{(E_{\omega,r} b(x)G(\omega, y))^2}{E_{\omega,r} G(\omega, x)^2},$$

where $r \in S_n$, $x = d(r)$, $y = f(x)$, $\omega \in \Omega$.

Hard-core predicates of a function are those that can be guessed from its output only with a negligible rate. Namely,

Definition 2 (Hard-Core Predicates):

A predicate b is called a *hard-core* with security s for a function $f \in F$ on $d \in F$ if $R_{G,f,b,d}(n) = o(1)/s(n)^\epsilon$, for some $\epsilon > 0$ and all probabilistic guessing algorithms G .

The security is *strict* if $\epsilon > 1$.

We call *padded* a function $f \in F$ of the form $f(x \circ p) = f'(x) \circ p$ for $\|p\| = \|x\|$. *Double-padded* f has $\|p\| = 2\|x\|$. Let $B(x, p) = \pm 1$ depending on the inner product mod 2 of the Boolean vectors x and p , $\|p\| = \|x\|$.

Theorem 1 *Let f and d be arbitrary padded functions and f be one-way on d with security s . Then B is a hard-core predicate for f on d (with the same security s).*

The theorem follows from the following Lemma, which efficiently reduces the task

of retrieving x from $f(x, p)$ to the task of approximating $B(x, p)$ given $f(x, p)$. The rate ε in the Lemma is chosen at random with distribution assuring the $O(1)$ average running time. Let $\tau(p, y) = \mathbb{E}_\omega |G(\omega, y, p)|$, $\tau(y) = \mathbb{E}_p \tau(p, y)$ and $\bar{\tau}(y) = \mathbb{E}_p \tau^2(p, y)$. Note that the guessing rate of G does not exceed the average over x of its *local* (i.e. taken over fixed $x, y = f'(x)$) guessing rates $R(x) = (\mathbb{E}_{\omega, p} B(x, p) G(\omega, y, p))^2 / \tau(y)$.

Lemma 1 (Main): *There exists an algorithm I that given a subroutine G , the coin-flip source $\omega \in \Omega$, and inputs $y \in S, \varepsilon \in (0, 1]$, outputs a list of $\bar{\tau}/\tau\varepsilon$ strings including all $x \in S_{\|y\|}$ with $R(x) \geq \varepsilon$. $I(\omega, y, \varepsilon)$ may fail for ε fraction of ω . The first of the two stages of I takes $1/\varepsilon$ steps of I and G . The second stage does not call G and takes $(\bar{\tau}/\tau\varepsilon)^2 < \varepsilon^{-2}$ steps.*

The proof is in Section 4. It seems likely that the second stage can also be sped up to $1/\varepsilon$ steps. The computation can be parallelized using $\varepsilon^{-O(1)}$ processors in $-\log \varepsilon$ time.

The theorem extends to $\log s(n)$ secure bits. For $c \in \{0, 1\}$, $a_0, a_1 \in S$, define $\text{Pr}_c(a_0, a_1) = a_c$.

Definition 3 (Hard-core function): A function $h: S \rightarrow S$ in \mathbf{P} is called a *hard-core* (with security s) of $f \in \mathbf{F}$ on $d \in \mathbf{F}$ if $b(x, r, c) = (-1)^c$ is a hard-core predicate (with security s) on d for the function $f_h(x, r, c) = f(x) \circ \text{Pr}_c(r, h(x)) \circ 0$, $\|r\| = \|h(x)\|$.

So, given $f(x)$, the output of a hard-core $h(x)$ should be indistinguishable in feasible time from a randomly chosen string r .

A *Toeplitz* matrix is a matrix M such that for all i, j , $M_{i,j} = M_{i+1,j+1}$. Let $k: \mathbf{N} \rightarrow \mathbf{N}$ and M_p be $k(n) \times n$ Boolean Toeplitz matrix with the first row and column determined by

the corresponding bits of p , $\|p\| \geq k(n) + n - 1$. Let Boolean vector $H_k(x, p)$ be the matrix product M_p times x , for $\|p\| = 2\|x\|$.

Corollary 1 *Let f, d be arbitrary double-padded functions and f is one-way on d with security $s \in \mathbf{P}$. Then, for some $\epsilon > 0$, $k(n) = \epsilon \log s(n)$, H_k is a hard-core function for f on d with the same security s .*

The proof is in Section 5. This number of pseudorandom bits cannot be improved without additional assumptions or a major breakthrough in complexity theory. The reason is that a one-way function with security s may act only on $\log s(\|x\|)$ of the bits of x and leave the rest unchanged.² A restriction of the “optimality” claim to bits extractable through linear transformations (as in the Corollary) can be easily proven.

4 Proof of Main Lemma

Our inverting algorithm $I(\omega, y, \varepsilon)$ lists all strings x for which G guesses B with a local rate $R(x) = (\mathbb{E}_{p, \omega} B(x, p) G(\omega, y, p))^2 / \tau(y) \geq \varepsilon$. I constructs the list L containing these strings and all their prefixes bit by bit, in $n = \|y\|$ rounds. The k -th round of I generates $L_k = L \cap S_k$. During the next round I examines all one-bit extensions of strings in L_k , discards some of them and keeps the rest.

Throughout the proof y, k, ε are fixed and used implicitly. So, let g be the matrix with components $g_{r,s} = \mathbb{E}_\omega G(\omega, y, rs)$, and b be the matrix with components $b_{z,r} = B(z, r)$ for $r, z \in S_k$.

²To exclude this possibility one must rule out the existence of one-way functions f with security $2^{\epsilon n}$. Otherwise $f_s(x'x'') = f(x')x''$, $\epsilon\|x'\| = \log s(\|x'x''\|)$ has security s .

Note 1 Matrix $2^{-k/2}b$ is symmetric and orthonormal, i.e. $b = b^T = 2^k b^{-1}$.

Proof: Indeed, $\sum_r (B(z, r))^2 = 2^k$. When z_1, z_2 differ by i -th digit, let $z = z_1 \oplus z_2$ and r' be r with i -th digit changed.

Then $\sum_r B(z_1, r)B(r, z_2) = \sum_r B(z, r) = 0$, since $B(z, r) = -B(z, r')$. ■

We discard prefixes z from L using an upper bound $c(z)$ for $R(x)\tau(y)$, $x = zz'$. It is $c(z) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} E_s(E_{r,\omega}B(zz', rs)G(\omega, y, rs))^2 = E_s(E_r B(z', s)B(z, r)g_{r,s})^2$, which then simplifies to $E_s(E_r B(z, r)g_{r,s})^2 = E_s(2^{-k}bg)_{z,s}^2$, since $B(z', s) = \pm 1$.

The number of $z \in S_k$ with $c(z) > \varepsilon\tau(y)$ remains limited:

Lemma 2 $\sum_z c(z) = E_{r,s}g_{r,s}^2 \leq 1$.

Proof: Any matrix multiplied by orthonormal matrix $2^{-k/2}b$ preserves its mean square of the elements. So, $\sum_z c(z) = 2^k E_z c(z) = E_{z,s}(2^{-k/2}bg)_{z,s}^2 = E_{r,s}g_{r,s}^2$. ■

All the above does not yield an efficient algorithm, since the straightforward computation of $c(z)$ takes exponential time. However, the exact value is not needed, a good approximation suffices:

Let $\tau_p = \tau(p, y)$ for $\|p\| = n$, $\tau_s = E_r \tau_{rs}$ for $\|rs\| = n$; $\bar{\tau}_s = E_r \tau_{rs}^2$.

Lemma 3 *There is a probabilistic algorithm $A(\omega, z, y, \delta)$ (using ω for its internal coin flips) that outputs an approximation $\tilde{c}(z)$ to $c(z)$ with accuracy $O(\delta)$ and probability of failure δ^3 . A halts within τ/δ steps, including the steps of the subroutine G . Only its last $\bar{\tau}/\delta$ steps depend on z .*

Proof Sketch: The approximation, $\tilde{c}(z)$, is computed as $\sum_i 4^{-i} E_s(c_s(z) > 2^{-i})$. If we get estimates with standard deviation α , repeating them $l = O(-\log \delta)$ times and taking

the median gives an approximation deviating from c_s by 2α with exponentially small, in l , probability. For every i we will need (within log factors) $4^{-i}/\delta$ samples of s and $4^i \tau_s$ samples of (r, ω') , of which $4^i \tau_s^2$ will produce a ± 1 guess. These “productive” samples may be reused for each z . ■

A speed up may be achieved by computing $\tilde{c}(z)$ simultaneously for many z .

Clearly all steps of passing from L_k to L_{k+1} can be made in parallel. Still each $k \leq n$ takes a sequential iteration. A parallel speed-up can be obtained by keeping the lists of candidates for all substrings of a particular length. Let $L_{i,l}$ be the list of candidates for the l -bit long substring of x starting at location i . Then $L_{i,2l}$ is formed by all strings z in the concatenation of $L_{i,l}, L_{i+l,l}$ having $c_i(z) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} E_{s',s''}(E_r B(z, r)g_{s'rs''})^2 > \varepsilon\tau$.

5 Proof of the Corollary

Corollary 1 is a special case of the following Lemma 4, as its conditions are obviously satisfied by the family of Toeplitz matrices. Another simple case is a family of all Boolean matrices. Let $a, k : \mathbf{N} \rightarrow \mathbf{N}$ be in P . Let $\{M_p : p \in S_{a(n)}\}$ be a family of $k(n) \times n$ Boolean matrices, $P(u, q, \omega)$ be an algorithm selecting (on inputs u, q and coin tosses ω) an index p such that $uM_p = q$, and $M_{P(u,q,w)}$ be computable in polynomial time.

Lemma 4 *Suppose M, P are as above and, for each $u \neq 0$, $E_{q,z}(p = P(u, q, z)) = 2^{-\|p\|}$. Then the function $H(x, p) = M_p x$ is hard-core for f on d with strict security s , if the predicate $B(x, q)$ is hard-core with strict security $s(n)4^{k(n)}$.*

The proof of Lemma 4 is based on the idea of [Vazirani 87]. It also incorporates the “XOR

condition” of [Vazirani Vazirani 84], proving that a function is hard-core iff the exclusive-or of any non-empty subset of its bits is.

Proof: The orthonormal functions $B_u: r \mapsto B(r, u)$ form a linear basis in the Euclidean space of all real functions on S_k . So, any function can be expressed as $g(r) = \sum_u c_u B_u(r)$, where $c_u = E_v B(v, u)g(v)$. A general form for the case $c_0 = E_r g(r) = 0$ is $g(r) = NE_{u \neq 0, v} B(v, u)g(v)B(r, u)$, with $N = 2^{\|r\|} - 1$.

Let an algorithm $G_{\omega, y, p}(r_c)$ guess $(-1)^c$ with correlation ε given $(y, p) = f(x, p) = (f'(x), p)$, the source ω of internal coin flips and $r_c = \Pr_c(M_p x, r)$. Without loss of generality we may assume $E_{\omega, r} G_{\omega, y, p}(r) = 0$, which may be achieved by modifying G so that with probability $1/2$ it is applied to a random string instead of its argument r and the sign of the output changed. Then $\overline{G}_{y, p}(r) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} E_{\omega} G_{\omega, y, p}(r) = NE_{u \neq 0, v} B(v, u) \overline{G}_{y, p}(v) B(r, u)$.

G 's correlation is: $E(-1)^c \overline{G}_{f'(x), p}(r_c) =$

$$NE(-1)^c E_{u \neq 0, v} B(v, u) \overline{G}_{f'(x), p}(v) B(r_c, u),$$

where $r_c = \Pr_c(M_p x, r)$ and E averages over x, p, r, c . For $c=1$, it is

$$-NE_{u \neq 0, v, x, p, r} B(v, u) \overline{G}_{f'(x), p}(v) B(r, u) = 0,$$

since $E_r B(r, u) = 0$, for each $u \neq 0$.

For the term $c = 0$, we use $B(Mx, u) = B(x, uM)$ and express $(1/N \text{ of})$ it as

$$\begin{aligned} & E_{u \neq 0, v, x, p} B(v, u) \overline{G}_{f'(x), p}(v) B(x, uM_p) \\ &= E_{\omega', x, q} g(\omega', f'(x), q) B(x, q), \end{aligned}$$

where $g(\omega', y, q) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} B(v, u) G_{\omega, y, P(u, q, w)}(v)$, with $u \neq 0, v, w, \omega$ generated with uniform distribution from ω' . So, g guesses $B(x, q)$ with correlation ε/N . ■

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