The Equation Group And GrayFish

How I learned to stop worrying and love the NSA

What Is The Equation Group

- Highly sophisticated threat actor
- Operating since 2001
- Only targets specific victims
- Multiple malware platforms
- Amount of technical expertise and resources suggest a nation-state backer
- "The Equation Group is probably one of the most sophisticated cyber attack groups in the world; and they are the most advanced threat actor we have seen"
 - Kaspersky Lab

Tools And Malware

- Fanny
 - maps air-gapped systems using USBs
- Double Fantasy, Triple Fantasy
 - used to verify targets
- EquationDrug, GrayFish
 - attack platforms used to steal information from the victims
- Physical interception of packages
- Command & Control servers
 - o issue commands to malware, and collect stolen data

Grayfish Basics

- What is Grayfish?
 - o flashes the firmware of HDs, and steals data
- How it works:
 - o Grayfish inserts a 'pill' into the firmware, hijacking the boot sequence of the operating system and gaining complete control of the system to install a Virtual File System in the registry of the hard drive.
 - Afterwards, malware is installed in the Virtual File System, which steals information from the system and stores it in hidden areas.

GrayFish Basics

GrayFish Re-flashes Hard OS uses infected VBR when **Drive Firmware** it boots Creates hidden Virtual File Firmware contains infected System in HD registry to Virtual Boot Record (VBR) store data Steals and Installs malicious modules Hidden Virtual File System stores data on machine

GrayFish Persistence

GrayFish Re-flashes Hard User removes OS uses infected VBR when **Drive Firmware** malicious modules it boots Creates hidden Virtual File Firmware contains infected System in HD registry to Virtual Boot Record (VBR) store data Steals and Installs malicious modules Hidden Virtual File System on machine stores data


Grayfish: why such a big deal?

- First instance of HD firmware hacking in the wild, extremely persistence
 - Reinstalling operating system or updating the HD firmware does nothing
 - Only possible way to get rid of it is to get a new hard drive.
- Nearly impossible for common criminal to replicate.
 - Need proprietary information of individual hard drive designs to construct malware
- Only way the equation group got a hold of so many major designs is if they stole them, or pressured the companies to hand them over.

Threat Models and Attack Vectors

- Two Threat models: Air Gapped and non Air Gapped
- Attack Vectors for non Air Gapped computer:
 - Cookie spoofing, spearphishing, csrf, xss and other
- Attack Vectors for Air Gapped Targets
 - Physically intercepting machines
 - USB infection
 - I.e. stuxnet hack, fanny

Attack Vector - Non Air Gapped



Attack Vector - Air Gapped



Victim

Infected with GrayFish










Equation Group

Attack Vector - Air Gapped



Attack Vector - Air Gapped



Infected with GrayFish



All Files Encrypted



Will be able to read all files or keys hidden by GrayFish



Equation Group

How To Detect Grayfish?

- Very difficult
 - all malware hidden in service area of the HD
- If there is some issue in rebooting the Operating System, the backup plan for Grayfish kicks in.

GrayFish architecture Exposes Single BBSVC service Infected VBR (polymorphic loader) Executable Shellcode from registry x1000 SHA-256 + AES **Encrypted container Exploit for Elby** file + Pill driver + loader (jump into kernel mode) Load platform kernel mode orchestrator (fvexpy.sys) Load user-mode part from registry (mpdkg32/64.dll) Start payloads (registry) KASPERSKYS GREAT

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Prevention In the Future

- Simple way to prevent firmware from being hacked
 - Manufactures sign firmware
- If anyone attempts to tamper with the firmware, the verification will fail.
 - Problem is firmware was not designed with security in mind

Source Code

- Almost no information available
- High Level of encryption
- Tied malicious payload to specific machines
- Easy to trigger self-destruct
 - If both boots fail, will remove itself from the system

Victim Specific Attack

- NTFS Object_Id is a id corresponding to a specific folder, that allows referencing without knowing the path.
 - System Folder Object_Id acts as a unique identifier for the system

Victim Specific Attack

Equation Group hashes stolen NTFS Object_ID 1000 times with SHA- 256 to create encryption key

Encrypts GrayFish using AES with the key above

Infects specific victim

Finds NTFS Object_Id of infected machine

System hashes NTFS
Object_ID 1000 times
with SHA- 256 to
create AES decryption
key

Decrypts GrayFish using AES with the key above

How Did Kaspersky Find Grayfish?

- The set up a server in the Middle East that does everything possible to look like a target
- Called the Magnet of Threats
- While looking for a similar type of malware called Regin, Kaspersky found several different kinds of Equation Group malware
- Sinkholed Equation Group C&C servers
 - o unite3tubes[.]com

Who Is The Equation Group?

- Highly sophisticated malware packages
- Target specific groups/individuals
- Indicates the backing of a Nation-State
- SO WHO COULD IT BE????
- The NSA


NSA: The Evidence

- Hours worked by the hackers are nearly exactly compatible with government employee work hours.
- Majority of targets are in Middle Eastern Countries, Russia, and China
- Code artifacts from the malware show several different names of operations(STRAITACID, STRAITSHOOTER, DRINKPARSLEY, BARKSNARF, etc) and a single line username "rmgree5")
- Most important evidence is...

Documents from Snowden Files

- Product page from ANT product catalog for NSA mentions a program called IRATEMONK which "provides software application persistence on...computers by implanting hard drive firmware to gain access by MBR substitution"
- This description matches the functionality of Grayfish

Working days of Equation Devs



Equation group victims map

- III Finance Government
 - Diplomatic / Embassies Research Institution
- Energy / Infrastructure
- University ✓ Aerospace
- Telecommunications
- Medical.

- C Islamic Scholars
- Media.

Other / Unknown

High infection rate Low infection rate Turkey Iran II A O & F = 4 K 1 Somalia S Russian Federation (A) (F) = = (F) (F) Myanmar Pakistan (A) (F) = (K) + (L) ▲ Germany South Africa India @ = 4 1 Nigeria C 1 United States China (a) 2 = Venezuela Syria (a) (1) Sudan Sudan Mali (A) (1 Palestinian Morocco Medium-level infection rate Malaysia Kazakhstan III 💞 Iraq Lebanon (2) W Brazil Yemen (k) 1 Uganda United Arab Emirates @ 4 Switzerland Algeria 🕖 🚨 Singapore Kenva (4) Philippines 2 Peru United Kingdom @ C 1 France Libya 😑 🚨 Equador Mexico III A 1 m Belgium Qatar (Bahrain


Military

Egypt (3)

Sources

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Attack Vector - Non Air Gapped



How Did Kaspersky Find Grayfish?

- Noticed that several Command & Control addresses hadn't been renewed
- Kaspersky bought domain names of several C&C servers
- Created sinkholes so that any EG malware still using compromised C&C servers could be traced
- Example C&C servers
 - o newjunk4u[.]com
 - o phoneysoap[.]com
 - o dowelsobject[.]com
 - o unite3tubes[.]com